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letters to the editor

TAX COURT DECISION UNSETTLES
IRS SUBCHAPTER S PROCEDURES
To the Edi tor:
Given the cru sh ing case lo ad th at its judg es must face,
it is not surprising th at from tim e to tim e th e Ta x Court
renders an op ini o n that on b ri ef reflection appears, sha ll
we say, il l-advi sed . However, not since its first opinion in
Larson ' has t he T ax Court shot itse lf in th e foot w ith th e
unerring accurac y d is pl ayed in Jon P. Smith .2 In an
admirably bri ef mem o ra ndum o pinion , th e court has
declared invalid te ns, pe rhaps hundreds, of thou sa nd s of
subchapter S electi o n s-s om e dating bac k to 1958. Unless th e court is c once rn ed th at now that it ha s com e to
grip s with its tax shelter case load its judg es wi ll be fac ing
underemp lo yme nt, its January 13 op inion in Smith shou ld
fol low its f irst Larson opin ion into th e wastebas ket labeled
" ind iscretion s we are not gOing to li ve to regret." (Fo r a
summary of Smith, see Tax Notes, Ja nuary 18, 1988, p .
255.)
The probl em co mes abou t like thi s. Th e making of a
subchapte r S elect io n has always bee n a fairly tricky
affair. Whil e th e f o rm loo ks li ke it c ould be c o mpleted by
the ave ra ge hi g h schoo l graduate, someh ow it never has
quite worked out th at way. I have never see n any stati stic s
on the numb er of S electi o n fo rm s th at th e Servi ce viewed
as ina ccurately or in c orrectly comp leted as fil ed, but my
ex peri e nc e sugg ests that t he numb ers are leg ion. Th e
problem of ta x payer- th at is, tax advi sor-e rro r in co mpleteing the elec t io n form ha s bee n co mpound ed by th e
ve ry narro w wind ow in tim e in which a valid election
c ould be made.3 In evitabl y, by th e time Se rvi ce personnel
ide ntified th e in adequac y in th e form as fi led and returned
it to th e tax paye r, th e time for fi li ng th e elect ion had
ex pired . In oth er areas of admini stering th e provisi on s of
su bch apter S pri o r to th e 1982 revisio n, th e Se rvic e
tend ed to ad opt surp rising ly rig id, if not d ownright host il e,
pos iti o ns. Ho wever, w ith regard to th e f iling of an in-

' In its first eff o rt in Larson , t he T ax Cou rt issued a n o pini o n
t hat wo ul d have treated virtu all y all lim ited pa rtn ershi ps as
c o rpora ti o ns, an app roac h that w as j ust slig htly ahea d of its
t ime . Two week s late r t he o pi n io n was with drawn . Ulti mately,
the cou rt reve rsed itse lf in a n opi ni o n that recon firm ed th e
formalism of the lin e betwee n corpo rat io ns a nd lim ited pa rt nerJ, ships. La rson v. Com mission er , 66 T .C . 159 (1976 ) acq. 1979-1
C.B . 1.
' Smith v. Co mmiss ion er, T .C . Me m o 1988- 18 (J a nu ary 13 ,
1988).
' See I. R.C. sectio n 1362(b )
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c orrect ly co mp leted elect io n form, t he Se rvi ce has fo r at
least 20 yea rs bee n appropriately forg iving . Defective
f o rms were returned to th e tax payer along with a notat io n
to th e effect t hat, if th e f o rm was properly c ompl eted and
return ed to th e Se rvi ce w ithin a reaso nable period o f
tim e, it wo uld be treated as effective o n th e day f irst
rece ived . Careful practi t ioners, not ing the abse nce of any
statuto ry bas is f o r th e Se rvi ce's ge nerosity, occasionally
wo rri ed ove r w het her th e Se rvice was bo un d to respect
t he val idi t y of a c orrected fo rm ref iled outside of t he
prescrib ed stat utory window . I doubt th at it eve r occ urred
to anyo ne, however, th at a tax payer might not be bound
by an elect io n so made. Clea rly, were th e tax payer not
bound by suc h an election, th e Se rvice wo uld have bee n
unab le to grant suc h leni ency .

[The Tax Court's1 January 13 opinion in Smith
should follow its first Larson opinion into the
wastebasket labeled 'indiscretions we are not
going to live to regret.'

Th e tax paye r in Sm i th was one of the countless benefici ari es of th e Se rvice 's generos ity. Th e election o rig inall y
fil ed in 1974 was in ex pli cably left un sign ed. Th e Se rvi ce
duly return ed the fo rm to the taxpayer wh o ca used it to
be sig ned a nd pro mpt ly refil ed wit h t he Se rvi ce . So me
yea rs later as defi c ienc y was asse rted aga inst th e shareho ld ers in t he S co rp oration, apparently att ri buta bl e to S
corporat io n items. In wh at all part ies mu st have rega rd ed
as an unusuall y co mpl ete enum erati on of th e gro un ds fo r
defendin g aga inst th e asse rted defi cienc y, th e taxpaye r
arg ued th at th e defi c iency co uld not be susta ined si nce
th e c orpo rati o n was not a va lid S co rpo rat io n. Ra t her, th e
tax payer arug ed, a va lid subc hapter S electi on had not
bee n fi led w ith in th e stat uto rily p resc ribed peri od of tim e
and th e Se rvi ce lacke d th e a uth o rit y to extend th e tim e
f o r fi lin g a subc ha pter S elect ion . As to un d ing ly, th e Tax
Co urt ag reed with th e taxpayer alth o ug h it rese rve d to
the Se rvice th e ri g ht to arg ue at tri al that the tax payer was
esto pped to deny t he vali d ity of its elect io n.
Th e implicatio ns of thi s o pini on should be a matte r of
g reat co nce rn f o r at least th e follo wing reaso ns.
1. Th e Tax Co urt has dec lared every subc hapte r S
electi on fi led in acco rd ance wi t h the Service's procedures
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to be avo idab le at t he option of the taxpayer for all open
yea rs. Wh il e presu mably few of th e thousa nds of taxpayers eligible to do so will act ually wish to disown
ret roactive ly t heir S elect ions ," as a matter of sound and
practical adm ini st ration of the ta x laws it is si mply un acceptab le that any taxpayer shou ld be granted that
opt ion.

It is not easy to see what useful purpose will be
served by litigating the question of whether a
taxpayer and the Service had the right to agree
that an election was in substantial compliance
with the regulations.

The opinion in Smith appears to create two grounds
upon wh ich the Service m ight defend against such attempted retroactive revocations of subchapter Select ions.
The Service argued that the elect ion in qu est ion wa s va li d
when f iled because t he form was in "substantial comp liance" with the procedura l requirements conta ined on
the form and in th e Treasu ry regu lat ions. Th e court,
however, rejected the arg ument that a sig nature was
mere ly procedura l orthat a form omitting such a signatu re
could be in substantia l compliance with the regu lations.
Arguably, other information requ ired by the fo rm might
be accorded less significance and would not p revent the
effectiveness of an elect ion . However, und er Smith It
becomes necessa ry to exp lo re t h rough case-by-case
litigation what ma nner of defect can be exc used unde r
the doctrine of substantia l comp liance, for the dec Ision
den ies to the Serv ice the right to make that determination .
It is not eas y to see what usefu l pu rpose w ill be served by
lit igat ing the question of whether a taxpayer and the
Service had th e right to agree that an elect ion was In
substantial co mpl iance w ith the regulations.
Second ly, the court is apparent ly wil ling to en tertain
the argument that the taxpayer, afte r hav ing p roper ly
exec uted and refi led its elect ion and thereafter operated
as an S corporation for six or , perhap s, 16, years , is
estopped to now d eny that the corporation Is a va lid S
corporati on. Again , however, that determinat ion for both
thi s and ot her tax payers wi ll requi re case - by-case litigat ion invoking the obscure and not wel l understood ru les
govern ing estoppel.
Unfortunately, thi s quite obvious ca use for concern in
th e wak e of the op inion in Smith is on ly th e mo st triv ial of
concerns.
2. The court d id not actua lly extend to ta xpaye rs an
opt ion to avo id the ir subchapter S elect ions. Th e court
held all such election s inva lid. As a resu lt, it is not only
open to taxpaye rs to avoid the i r S elect ions but also to
the Internal Revenue Service. Thu s, und er the opinion in
Sm i th, th e Se rv ice is now free to locate eac h S corporation that took advantage of its generous refiling procedure
and attack eac h of tho se subc hapter S elect ions for al l
open yea rs. At this po int, there is no indication whatsoeve r
that th e Se rvice will adopt suc h a posit ion and it wou ld be

"Each of th ei r tax advisors, howeve r, mu st ex plo re th e poss ibility.
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qu ite su rpri si ng if it we re to do so. On the other hand ,
were ta xpaye rs to seek to avoid burdensome Selec tions ,
it could hard ly be rega rd ed as ineq u itab le for the Service
to adopt a simi lar posture. Of course, if the Service can
argue that taxpayer s are esto pped from avo iding the ir S
elec t ion s, taxpaye rs also should be ab le to argue that the
Se rvic e is estopped to deny the va li d ity of the elect ions it
accept ed. Yet the very thought of hav ing to sustain a
subchapter S elect ion by asserting that th e government is
esto pped to deny the va li d ity of th e elect ion is nothing
less than a tax practitioner' s nightmare S Th e worst nightmare, however, it yet to come.
3. If the dec isio n in Smith stand s as a correct stateme nt
o f the law, it will sim ply be impossib le for the Serv ice to
co ntinu e its lenient atti t ude towa rds the fi li ng of S election s. If refiled elect ions have no binding effect on either
the taxpayer or the gove rnment, inv iti ng such ref ilings
becomes a folly, if not a fraud, and the practice wou ld
have to be terminated . As a resu lt, in th e future electio ns
bearing trivia l d efects cannot be saved . They will si mply
not be effective for the year for which they were f iled B
Th at alone shou ld produce a min iboom in ma l pract ice
litigation . The worst, however, is yet to come .

Presumably . .. all elections that we re tec h nically defective when made for any of a wide
range of reasons, but nevertheless we re accepted by the Service, must now be regarded as
invalid . ...

4. Taxpaye rs can bung le a subchapter S elect ion in
quite a w ide variety of ways . Incorrect ly comp leting the
election form sca rce ly ex hausts the poss ib il it ies. Indeed ,
t he b l under current ly in vogue is for the benef iciary of a
so ca lled qua lified subchapter S trust to fai l to make the
se parate election w ith respect to the trust that is necessary
to make the trust a qua lif ied S corporation shareholder. 7
Wh ile the recent revi sion of subchapter S granted the
Se rvice the authority to overlook unintentiona l terminations of subchapter S elections, a there is no corresponding statutory author it y authorizing the Service to over look
faulty elec t ions. As has been po inted out else where ,9 it is
not easy to arg ue that a corporat ion that never made a
valid election can be treated as inadvertent ly term inating
its election, thereby becom ing elig ib le for the statutory
relief. The Se rvice has bravely attempted to bridge that
statutory omission. In a series of private rul ings th e
Serv ice has found taxpayers to be in substantia l compliance with th e statutory provision s, and thus, conc luded
that the elec t ion was effecti ve .1O If the deci sion in Smith

' For some bedtime reading, see Automobile Club of Mic higan
v. Commissione r, 363 U .S. 180 (1982); and Green v. Cag le, 85-2
U.S.T.C . sect ion 13,634 (1986).
GUnd e r current law, the election may be effect ive for th e
fo ll owing year. I.R.C. sec tions 1362(b)(2) and (3).
' I.R.C. sec tion 1361(d)(2).
"I.R.C . sec tion 1362 (1) .
9Coven, Making Subchapter S Work, Tax No te s, July 21 , 1986.
pp. 271, 274.
lOSee, e.g., L TR 8802067 and L TR 8753030.
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stands, it seems u nlike ly t hat the Servic e w ill be able to
cont inue this equally le ni ent po licy. If an unsigned S
election does not constitute su bstant ial compl iance w ith
the statutory provisions, it is not ea sy to see how an
unfiled trust elect ion can c on sti t ute substantial compliance. Presumab ly, therefore , as matters now stand, al l
elections that were techn ica lly defect ive when made for
any of a wide range of reasons, but neverthe less were
accepted by the Se rvice, must now be regarded as invalid
and both avoidab le by the ta x payer and subject to challenge by the Service.
5. The imp lications of the decision in Smith do not end
with subchapter S. Read more broadly, the opinion stands
for the proposit ion that when ever the Internal Revenue
Service has not held a taxpayer to rigid litera l comp li ance
with statutory or regu latory requirements, the action
taken may, decades later, be chal lenged by either party.
Nothing cou ld be more corrosive of the integrity of the
administration of the tax ing system.
The decision in Smith does not serve the best interests
of taxpayers or the Service or the Tax Court . The decision
is clearly bad as a matter of tax po licy. It will seriously
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undermine the ability of the Service to administer t he ta x
system in a fair and rea sonab le manner. Moreover, th e
decision is equa lly unnecessary as a matter of law.
However, the election in Smith was valid ly executed .
Admittedly , an el ection fi led out of time may be invalid
becau se the Serv ice lacks the statutory authority to
extend the time in which the elect ion may be made.
However, the election in Smith was originally fi led in a
time ly manner. The conclusion that the prompt but un timely addition of a signature to the tim ely fil ed election
in accordance with the long-established proc edures of a
government agency does not constitute sub stantia l compliance with the statutory requirements is the product of
a blind and se lf-de structive formalism. The Ta x Court
shou ld serious ly cons ider withdrawing and rethinking it s
pos ition in Smith.
Sincerely,
Glenn E. Coven
Professor of Law
Colleg e of Wil liam & Mary
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